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ENSURING A FAIR HEARING FOR 
LITIGANTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES: 
THE LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY OF 
CAPACITY, ADMISSIBILITY, AND 
CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENTS IN CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS 
Kevin M. Cremin, Jean Philips, Claudia Sickinger, M.D., and 
Jeanette Zelhof* 
Q: Did you have any occasion before this to review  
records or talk to psychiatrists or anybody else regarding 
the mental health condition of Resident G? 
A:  No, I did not. 
Q:  Did you know if Resident G was just a big liar? 
A:  No. 
Q: Okay. Well, did you check her records or talk to her 
psychiatrist to see whether one of the problems with her 
mental health is that she‘s a liar? 
A:  No. 
Q: Okay. Resident E[,] does he have a mental health 
diagnosis? 
. . . 
A: . . . He‘s schizophrenic. 
                                                        
 * Kevin M. Cremin is a senior attorney at MFY Legal Services, Inc., and a 
Lecturer-in-Law at Columbia Law School. Jean Philips is a former staff attorney 
at MFY Legal Services, Inc. Dr. Claudia Sickinger is a psychiatrist and the 
medical director of the Westchester ARC Clinic. Dr. Sickinger is a graduate of 
Mt. Sinai Medical Center and a former fellow in public psychiatry at Columbia 
University/New York State Psychiatric Institute. Jeanette Zelhof is the Deputy 
Director of MFY Legal Services, Inc. The authors wish to thank Elise Brown for 
her assistance with this article. 
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. . . 
Q:  Did you ask Resident E for consent to be able to review 
his mental health records? 
A:  No, I did not. 
Q:  Do you know how big a liar Resident E is? 
. . .
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
The above quotation is from a proceeding against the operator 
of an adult home in New York City that houses over 200 
individuals with disabilities. In that proceeding, the New York 
State Department of Health accused the operator of abusing and 
exploiting the home‘s mentally ill residents.2 The quotation 
provides an example of the types of difficulties and, in some cases, 
outright injustices experienced by people with mental illnesses 
(PWMI) when proceedings involving their interests are heard in 
court or administrative hearings.  
Featured is a line of questioning of a government witness by 
the operator‘s attorney, who equated being mentally ill with being 
a ―big liar.‖ Never during this line of questioning did attorneys for 
the New York State Department of Health, which was purportedly 
representing the interests of the residents, object.
3
 There were 
                                                        
1 Transcript of Hearing at 522–24, In the Matter of Antonia C. Novello, as 
Comm‘r of Health of the State New York, to determine the action to be taken 
with respect to Benito Fernandez, as Operator of Brooklyn Manor Home for 
Adults (N.Y. Dep‘t of Health Jan. 23, 2006) (Unpublished Report and Decision) 
(copy on file at MFY Legal Services, Inc.) [hereinafter Transcript of Hearing, In 
the Matter of Antonia C. Novello]. In this proceeding, the Honorable James F. 
Horan, an Administrative Law Judge, was charged with determining whether the 
operating certificate of Benito Fernandez, operator of Brooklyn Manor Home 
for Adults, should be revoked. 
2 See id. 
3 Although ―[t]he rules of evidence need not be observed‖ during an 
administrative hearing involving the New York State Department of Health, 
parties may make requests and submit exceptions, and the hearing officer has 
the power to ―admit or exclude evidence.‖ See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 10, §§ 51.11(d)(2), 51.9(c)(1), (6) (2008). 
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numerous potential objections to these questions because, at the 
very least, they were argumentative, lacked a proper foundation, 
and assumed facts that were not in evidence. The residents whose 
complaints were the subject of the hearing were not able to defend 
themselves from these attacks because both they and their 
advocates from MFY Legal Services, Inc. (MFY), were barred 
from attending the proceeding. Unfortunately, this type of 
treatment of PWMI is commonplace in our legal system.  
Most PWMI do not live in institutions.
4
 In fact, most reside in 
the community and are active members of society. Like other 
people, they are subject to being sued and can bring their own 
lawsuits. When PWMI are in court, however, the stakes are often 
quite high. Even in civil cases, judges may have the power to 
grant, preserve, or deny government benefits that enable PWMI to 
obtain basic necessities. Judges also may be empowered to make 
decisions that could result in PWMI being evicted from their 
homes. It is therefore essential to ensure that PWMI are able to 
obtain fair hearings that are free from discrimination. 
This Article arises from the work of MFY‘s Mental Health 
Law Project and Adult Home Advocacy Project in courts of law 
and administrative proceedings in New York City. MFY has 
provided free civil legal services to low-income New Yorkers 
since its founding in 1963. It was originally a unit of Mobilization 
for Youth, a social welfare organization on Manhattan‘s Lower 
East Side, but was incorporated as a separate not-for-profit law 
firm in 1968. Since 1983, MFY‘s Mental Health Law Project has 
provided advocacy services to PWMI, including consultation, 
advice, and direct representation. Since 1992, MFY‘s Adult Home 
                                                        
4 According to the National Institute of Mental Health, ―[a]n estimated 26.2 
percent of Americans ages 18 and older—about one in four adults—suffer from 
a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.‖ National Institute of Mental 
Health, The Numbers Count: Mental Disorders in America, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numbers-count-mental-
disorders-in-america.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2008). Institutionalization does, 
however, still occur. See, e.g., Susan Stefan, “Discredited” and 
“Discreditable”: The Search for Political Identity by People with Psychiatric 
Diagnoses, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1366 (2003) (noting that ―49 states 
still have mental hospitals‖). 
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Advocacy Project has focused on protecting the rights of mentally 
ill residents of adult homes.
5
 These projects represent PWMI in 
matters related to housing, Supplemental Security Income and 
Social Security Disability benefits, public assistance, Medicaid, 
civil rights, and numerous other issues. MFY‘s representation 
enables PWMI to avoid homelessness and to remain in the 
community by ensuring the preservation of their incomes and 
affordable housing. During 2008 alone, the organization advised or 
represented more than 2,500 PWMI.  
Given the volume and the nature of its caseload, MFY has a 
unique perspective on the problems facing PWMI in civil and 
administrative proceedings. Although there are other organizations 
and governmental entities that represent PWMI, they generally do 
so in cases where the client‘s disability is always central to the 
legal issue at hand—such as involuntary commitment or social 
security hearings. MFY, however, represents PWMI in a wide 
range of cases, in many of which the client‘s disability is not 
centrally or even peripherally relevant to his or her legal problem. 
Yet, even in those matters, MFY often sees how a tribunal‘s 
treatment of the client is skewed by the knowledge that he or she 
has a mental health problem.  
The purpose of this Article is to highlight the problems 
encountered by PWMI giving testimony in civil and administrative 
                                                        
5 See generally http://www.mfy.org/adulthome.shtml. In New York, an 
adult home is defined as a facility that is ―established and operated for the 
purpose of providing long-term residential care, room, board, housekeeping, 
personal care and supervision to five or more adults unrelated to the operator.‖ 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 487.2(a) (2008). Adult homes are for 
―adults who, though not requiring continual medical or nursing care . . . , are, by 
reason of physical or other limitations associated with age, physical or mental 
disabilities or other factors, unable or substantially unable to live independently.‖ 
Id. § 485.2(a). Outside of New York State, adult homes are generally known as 
―board and care homes.‖ Medicare defines a ―board and care home‖ as ―group 
living arrangement [that] provides help with activities of daily living such as 
eating, bathing, and using the bathroom for people who cannot live on their own 
but do not need nursing home services.‖ Medicare: Types of Long-Term Care, 
http://www.medicare.gov/LongTermCare/Static/BoardCareHome.asp?dest=NA
V%7CTypes%7CTypes%7CBoardCareHome#TabTop (last visited Dec. 17, 
2008). 
CREMIN_6-5-09 6/6/2009  12:41 PM 
 MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT MENTAL ILLNESS 459 
proceedings and to challenge court personnel and advocates to 
rethink their approaches to matters involving PWMI in light of 
modern clinical information and available research on the subject. 
We also offer some suggestions on how to facilitate better 
communication and obtain useful testimony in civil court 
proceedings involving PWMI, which we hope will lead to more 
equitable rulings.  
Part I of this Article describes the way in which the legal 
system determines the capacity and credibility of PWMI who are 
involved in litigation. This part begins with a discussion of the 
applicable law regarding the determination of capacity, 
admissibility, and credibility. It then gives examples of how, in 
practice, these legal standards are often ignored or misapplied due 
to improper assumptions and prejudices about PWMI. 
Part II presents modern clinical evidence regarding the capacity 
and credibility of PWMI. In this part, we show that data available 
from research studies support the notion that having a particular 
mental health condition does not necessarily mean that an 
individual lacks capacity to testify. Similarly, with regard to 
credibility, the clinical evidence shows that it is not possible to 
make generalizations regarding an individual‘s ability to provide 
accurate information simply based on whether that individual has a 
psychiatric diagnosis or a mental health history.  
Part III of this Article sets forth a series of recommendations 
that would improve the ability of the legal system to provide fair 
hearings for PWMI. These recommendations include: training 
court personnel, advocates, and guardians ad litem to improve their 
understanding of mental illness and PWMI; enforcing legal and 
evidentiary standards in light of modern clinical research findings; 
and providing reasonable accommodations to improve the 
accessibility of the court system for PWMI.  
I. CAPACITY, ADMISSIBILITY, AND CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS 
RELATED TO PWMI IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
MFY‘s experience representing PWMI in various forums is 
that the testimony of PWMI is often excluded or disregarded. 
Sometimes this is because legal standards that presume PWMI to 
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have the capacity to testify are ignored or misapplied. Sometimes 
the law is nominally applied, but courts make rulings based on 
unwarranted and prejudicial inferences about mental illness. 
Frequently, however, there is no legal analysis because courts or 
advocates either assume without discussion that the testimony of 
witnesses with mental illnesses is not valuable, or because they are 
not willing to make accommodations necessary to enable this 
testimony to be taken. 
A. The Law Regarding Capacity, Admissibility, and Credibility 
1. The Threshold Question: Capacity to Testify 
Before reaching issues of admissibility and credibility, courts 
may examine the threshold question of whether a witness with a 
mental disability has the capacity to testify. The capacity of a 
witness to testify is a question of law; in other words, in a jury 
trial, the judge makes this decision.
6
 In New York, as in federal 
courts, there is a presumption of an adult witness‘s capacity to 
testify.
7
 There is also a general policy that favors allowing litigants 
with mental disabilities to testify.
8
 
The question of whether an individual has the capacity to 
testify in court is entirely distinct from the question of whether an 
                                                        
6 See FED. R. EVID. 601 (―Every person is competent to be a witness except 
as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, 
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies 
the rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in 
accordance with State law.‖); People v. Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d 210, 213 (1978) 
(―The capacity of a person to be a witness is presumed and, if objection is made 
that he is incompetent, it is for the judge, in the exercise of his discretion, to 
determine his mental capacity to testify.‖).  
7 See FED. R. EVID. 601; Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d at 213.  
8 See Tromello v. Dibuono, 132 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (―The 
competency test above has been liberally construed in favor of the admission of 
testimony by persons with limited mental capacity. Thus, for example, courts in 
New York have determined in favor of admitting testimony by a nonverbal, 
autistic and mentally retarded 11-year-old child, by a person judicially declared 
incompetent and unable to manage his affairs, and mentally retarded adults with 
the mental age of four- to six-year-olds.‖) (internal citations omitted). 
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individual has capacity in any other aspect of his or her life. An 
individual may have diminished capacity in one area while 
retaining capacity in others. Almost one hundred years ago, the 
New York State Court of Appeals ruled against appellants who 
claimed that testimony given by the complaining witness should 
not have been allowed on the ground that he had been judicially 
declared ―incompetent to manage his own affairs‖ several years 
earlier.
9
 In denying this ground for the appeal, the court noted:  
It did not by any means follow from [the prior declaration 
of incompetence] as a matter of law that he was, and for 
years would continue to be, so utterly lacking in 
intelligence that he could not appreciate at all the 
relationship and significance of facts and would not be able 
to understand the obligation of an oath and describe 
accurately what those facts were.
10
  
Since that time, statutory law on the capacity of PWMI has 
evolved with society‘s understanding of the complexity of mental 
illness. The New York Mental Hygiene Law, which allows courts 
to appoint guardians for individuals proven to be incapable of 
managing their own affairs, no longer provides for a simple 
adjudication of ―competency‖ or ―incompetency.‖11 Instead, a 
court must tailor a guardianship order to afford an incapacitated 
individual the maximum amount of independence possible. A court 
may grant a guardian powers only in the specific areas in which it 
determines that the individual requires assistance.
12
 Thus, even if a 
                                                        
9 See Barker v. Washburn, 200 N.Y. 280, 283 (1911).  
10 Id. 
11 Competency was the standard under the former conservator and 
committee statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. Civil Practice Act 207 (2005); see also N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 77–78 (repealed 1992). Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene 
Law, which replaced the conservator and committee statutes, no longer uses a 
competency standard. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.01–81.43 (McKinney 
2005). 
12 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2005) (―The 
legislature declares that it is the purpose of this act to promote the public welfare 
by establishing a guardianship system which is appropriate to satisfy either 
personal or property management needs of an incapacitated person in a manner 
tailored to the individual needs of that person, which takes in account the 
personal wishes, preferences and desires of the person, and which affords the 
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guardian is appointed to apply for government benefits on a 
person‘s behalf, the same person may retain her right to make 
decisions about how to spend the government benefits.
13
 Similarly, 
pursuant to Article 81 of New York‘s Mental Hygiene Law, it is 
possible for someone to be adjudicated incompetent to budget his 
or her income, but competent to retain counsel and manage his or 
her own medications.
14
  
For the same reason, when determining whether a witness has 
the capacity to testify, it is inappropriate for a judge to make any 
general assumptions. Instead, judges should ask two questions 
when the capacity of a witness is challenged: (1) whether the 
proposed witness is capable of comprehending the nature of an 
oath, and (2) whether the witness is capable of giving an accurate 
account of what he or she has seen and heard.
15
 The second 
question carries greater weight, as the necessity of the oath itself 
has been called into question during recent years.
16
  
This is true even in the context of criminal cases in New York. 
Section 60.20 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law states that 
―[a]ny person may be a witness in a criminal proceeding unless the 
court finds that, by reason of infancy or mental disease or defect, 
he does not possess sufficient intelligence or capacity to justify the 
                                                        
person the greatest amount of independence and self-determination and 
participation in all the decisions affecting such person‘s life.‖). 
13 See id. § 81.22(a)(7); see also id. § 81.29(a) (―An incapacitated person 
for whom a guardian has been appointed retains all powers and rights except 
those powers and rights which the guardian is granted.‖).  
14 See id. § 81.02. 
15 See, e.g., District of Columbia. v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519, 521–22 (1883); 
People v. Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d 210, 213 (1964); Ellarson v. Ellarson, 190 N.Y.S. 
6, 8 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t 1921); see also FED. R. EVID. 603.  
16 In Brown v. Ristich, 36 N.Y.2d 183 (1975), the New York State Court of 
Appeals reinstated an administrative decision that had been overturned on the 
grounds that mentally retarded witnesses had not been administered an oath. At 
the hearing, it had been determined that although the witnesses had capacity to 
recount events, it would be senseless to administer an oath, because the 
witnesses would not understand what it meant. See id. at 187. The court ruled 
that where administration of an oath would not serve its purpose, witnesses 
could testify unsworn, provided sufficient foundation existed supporting the 
administrative law judge‘s determination of capacity. See id. at 190.  
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reception of his evidence.‖17 Witnesses who are ―more than nine 
years old‖ are generally required to testify under oath.18 A court 
may make an exception, however, if it ―is satisfied that such 
witness cannot, as a result of mental disease or defect, understand 
the nature of an oath‖ but that ―the witness possesses sufficient 
intelligence and capacity to justify the reception [of unsworn 
evidence].‖19 The only caveat is that a defendant cannot be 
convicted solely on the basis of such unsworn evidence.
20
 
2. Admissibility and Exclusion of Evidence  
Related to Mental Illness  
When a witness with a mental disability testifies, the question 
is raised whether evidence of his or her disability should be 
admitted. The court makes the legal decision as to whether such 
evidence should be admitted or excluded.
21
 This aspect of the 
process is essential because when evidence regarding the mental 
health of a witness is readily admitted, the focus of the case 
frequently shifts to mental health rather than the substantive legal 
issues at stake.  
The rules of evidence governing relevancy and admissibility in 
New York state courts are generally consistent with the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. Evidence is relevant ―if it has any tendency in 
reason to prove the existence of any material fact, i.e., it makes 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence.‖22 In general, ―all relevant 
evidence is admissible unless its admission violates some 
                                                        
17 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.20(1) (2008).  
18 Id. § 60.20(2). 
19 Id.  
20 Id. § 60.20(3).  
21 See People v. Lowe, 408 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978) 
(citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.20).  
22 People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 777 (1988); see FED. R. EVID. 401 
(―‗Relevant evidence‘ means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.‖). 
CREMIN_6-5-09 6/6/2009  12:41 PM 
464 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
exclusionary rule.‖23  
The most commonly invoked exclusionary rule is that relevant 
evidence ―may still be excluded by the trial court in the exercise of 
its discretion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger that it will unfairly prejudice the other side or mislead 
the jury.‖24 Given the stigma that is attached to mental illness, it is 
likely that the danger of unfair prejudice would substantially 
outweigh the probative value of a mental health history in any case 
where that mental health history does not directly implicate the 
subject matter of the case or the witness‘s veracity.  
Furthermore, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
use of ―character evidence‖ is generally excluded. Rule 404 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence states that ―[e]vidence of a person‘s 
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of 
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion‖ 
except under three enumerated circumstances.
25
 The first two 
circumstances pertain to criminal cases and involve the character 
of the accused and the character of the alleged victim.
26
 The third 
circumstance applies to the character of witnesses in both civil and 
criminal cases and allows, inter alia, character evidence to be used 
to attack the credibility of a witness.
27
 Similarly, ―the credibility of 
a witness may be attacked . . . by evidence in the form of opinion 
                                                        
23 Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d at 777; see FED. R. EVID. 402 (―All relevant evidence 
is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.‖). 
24 Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d at 777; see FED. R. EVID. 403 (―Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.‖). 
25 FED. R. EVID. 404(a); see, e.g., Fanelli v. diLorenzo, 591 N.Y.S.2d 658, 
659 (App. Div. 4th Dep‘t 1992) (holding that the trial court‘s admission of 
―testimony that [the defendant] was typically non-violent and mellow when 
intoxicated‖ constituted reversible error). 
26 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1)–(2). 
27 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) (referring to FED. R. EVID. 607, which states: 
―The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party 
calling the witness.‖). 
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or reputation, but . . . the evidence may refer only to character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness.‖28  
Questions involving the admissibility of evidence of mental 
illness arise frequently in criminal trials, when an individual with 
mental illness is the complaining witness or the defendant. PWMI 
are often in the position of being the complaining witnesses 
because they are far more likely to be the victims of crime than 
people who do not have mental health problems.
29
  
During criminal trials, evidence of mental illness is often 
admitted under the exceptions to Rule 404‘s prohibition on the use 
of ―character evidence.‖30 In cases where the sole or main witness 
against a criminal defendant is discovered to have had a mental 
illness that was not revealed to the jury, New York appellate courts 
have overturned verdicts and ordered new trials.
31
 Some courts, 
however, specify that evidence of mental illness should be 
admitted only if the mental condition in question may affect the 
accuracy of the testimony.
32
 This qualification is important 
                                                        
28 FED. R. EVID. 608(a); accord FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3). 
29 Aaron Levin, People With Mental Illness More Often Crime Victims, 
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Sept. 2, 2005, at 16 (noting that a recent study found that 
―[m]ore than one-fourth of persons with severe mental illness are victims of 
violent crime in the course of a year, a rate 11 times higher than that of the 
general population‖). Although PWMI are disproportionately the victims of 
crimes, more attention is often paid to their role in the criminal justice system as 
alleged perpetrators. In recent years, increasing attention has been focused on 
the criminalization of mental illness and the inability of courts to meet the needs 
of PWMI who stand accused or who accuse others of committing criminal acts 
against them. See generally J. Steven Lamberti & Robert L. Weisman, Persons 
with Severe Mental Disorders in the Criminal Justice System: Challenges and 
Opportunities, 75 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 151 (2004); Michael D. Thompson, Melissa 
Reuland & Daniel Souweiene, Criminal Justice/Mental Health Consensus: 
Improving Responses to People with Mental Illness, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 
30 (2003). 
30 See, e.g., People v. Lowe, 408 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978) 
(―Evidence of the mental illness of a witness is a fact that a jury is entitled to 
know so that it may ‗. . . assess and evaluate the testimony given by him and not 
accept it . . . as the statement of a ‗normal‘ individual.‘‖) (quoting People v. 
Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d 210, 213–14 (1964)).  
31 See, e.g., Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d at 213–15.  
32 See Lowe, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 875–76 (―Where, as here, there is knowledge 
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because, as discussed in Section II.B below, most mental illnesses 
do not have a bearing on an individual‘s ability to recount events 
accurately.  
The Federal Rape Shield Law provides a good example of the 
limited protection that exclusionary rules often provide for crime 
victims or witnesses who have histories of mental health problems. 
As codified by Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
Federal Rape Shield Law ―broadly reflects the rejection of a 
system that conflated a woman‘s chastity with her credibility.‖33 
With certain limited exceptions, ―[e]vidence offered to prove that 
any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior,‖ and 
―[e]vidence offered to prove any alleged victim‘s sexual 
predisposition‖ is inadmissible in ―any civil or criminal proceeding 
involving alleged sexual misconduct.‖34  
However, the Federal Rape Shield Law ―leave[s] at least one 
large gap. In most states, neither the rape shield law, the other rules 
of evidence, nor the case law set out comprehensive guidelines for 
the admissibility of evidence of the complainant‘s mental 
health.‖35 As a result, subject to other evidentiary rules, 
―defendants may still request a review of a complainant‘s mental 
health history, a mental examination, or cross-examination as to a 
history of psychological problems.‖36 This is a significant gap 
because, according to one study, PWMI are ―23 times more likely 
to be raped than . . . the general population.‖37 As discussed in 
                                                        
or a long-standing, ongoing mental condition of a complainant who is the sole 
eyewitness to the crime, and where such condition may affect the accuracy, 
perception and comprehension of his testimony, evidence must be disclosed to 
the defendants concerning such a condition.‖) (emphasis added). 
33 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Admitting Mental Health Evidence to Impeach the 
Credibility of a Sexual Assault Complainant, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1374 
(2005). 
34 FED. R. EVID. 412(a); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 
2008). 
35 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 33, at 1374. 
36 Id. 
37 Levin, supra note 29, at 16 (noting that a recent study found that ―[m]ore 
than one-fourth of persons with severe mental illness are victims of violent 
crime in the course of a year, a rate 11 times higher than that of the general 
population‖). 
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Parts II.B and III.B below, the idea that it is always necessary for a 
jury to hear about a witness‘s mental health diagnosis to evaluate 
her testimony is contradicted by clinical information that indicates 
that most mental illnesses do not affect a person‘s ability to 
perceive events or her ability to recount them.  
3. Credibility Assessments by Factfinders 
If an individual with mental illness is found to have the 
capacity to testify, the factfinder is responsible for assessing his or 
her credibility.
38
 Similarly, if evidence of the witness‘s mental 
illness is admitted by the court, the factfinder is charged with 
deciding how, if at all, that evidence affects the weight of the 
witness‘s testimony.39  
As one commentator has pointed out, even though ―[t]he 
evaluation of witness credibility is crucial to the process of fact-
finding, . . . there is no law of witness credibility.‖40 Factfinders 
have considerable discretion in determining how to weigh the 
evidence that has been admitted. Absent ―glaring error,‖ that 
discretion goes unchecked by the appellate courts.
41
 
Factfinders, however, are not always left to their own devices. 
Some courts have allowed for the use of so-called ―framing 
testimony‖ by experts to give the factfinder input or guidance as to 
how the evidence should be weighed. One form of framing 
testimony is criteria-based content analysis (CBCA).
42
 CBCA has 
                                                        
38 See FED. R. EVID. 104(e); see also Hon. James P. Timony, Demeanor 
Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 904–05 (2000). 
39 See FED. R. EVID. 104(e); see also Steven I. Friedland, On Common 
Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 
178–80 (1990). 
40 Morris D. Bernstein, Judging Witness Credibility: A Talmudic 
Perspective, 5 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION. 4, 4 (2003). 
41 Id. (―It is a foundational principle that, absent glaring error by the trial 
court, an appellate court will not review the findings of fact made at trial.‖). 
42 CBCA is a technique used by a psychiatrist or psychologist to attempt to 
determine the veracity of a statement by evaluating its verbal content. See C.L. 
Ruby & John C. Brigham, The Usefulness of the Criteria-Based Content 
Analysis Technique in Distinguishing Between Truthful and Fabricated 
Allegations: A Critical Review, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 705, 705 (1997). 
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been used in some American courts as an aid in assessing the 
credibility of statements made by children in the context of abuse 
cases.
43
 In general, however, studies on the efficacy of CBCA have 
yielded ―mixed results.‖44  
Similarly, courts often allow expert witnesses to testify about 
the credibility of eyewitness identifications.
45
 Eyewitness expert 
testimony is a form of ―social framework testimony.‖46 Social 
framework testimony ―presents ‗general conclusions from social 
science research‘‖ and provides a ―context or framework for 
evaluating what eyewitnesses report—but the jurors do the 
evaluating.‖47 Instead of commenting upon the credibility of the 
identification itself, eyewitness expert testimony ―explains what 
scientists know about how factors that may have been operating in 
the case at trial increase or decrease the likelihood of eyewitness 
accuracy.‖48  
Factfinders are generally prone to give too much weight to 
eyewitness testimony, yet, in our experience, they often improperly 
discount the eyewitness testimony of PWMI. In situations where 
the mental illness itself is central to the lawsuit, framing testimony 
by a mental health professional can be used to prevent a PWMI 
from being unfairly discredited. A mental health professional can 
discuss modern clinical research findings, like those presented in 
Part II below,
49
 in order to provide context for the factfinder who is 
charged with evaluating the testimony of a PWMI. Where the 
                                                        
43 Id. at 705–06.  
44 See id. at 716. 
45 See People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 452 (2007) (holding that it is an 
abuse of discretion for a court to exclude expert testimony on the reliability of 
eyewitness identification ―where the case turns on the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the 
defendant to the crime‖); but see Decision of the Day, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 2008, 
at 18 (denying appeal in People v. Abney based on court‘s refusal to permit the 
defense to present expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications because there was evidence corroborating the identification). 
46 Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony about Eyewitness 
Memory, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 909, 910 (1995).  
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 922. 
49 See infra notes 82–101 and accompanying text. 
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mental illness is of a variety that may impede perception of reality 
or ability to communicate, a mental health professional can also 
elucidate what symptoms may or may not impact the testimony. 
Although there may be objections to offering such framing 
testimony, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that 
―[i]f scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise . . . .‖50 
B. Misapplications and Shortcomings of the Law Regarding 
Capacity and Credibility 
1. The Inaccurate Assumption that Lack of  
Capacity in One Area Means Lack of  
Capacity in All Areas 
An individual may have diminished capacity in one area of his 
or her life while retaining capacity in others. As discussed in Part 
I.A.1, the New York Mental Hygiene Law requires courts to tailor 
guardianship orders to afford an incapacitated individual the 
maximum amount of independence possible.
51
 In practice, 
however, legal analysis often conflicts with established 
jurisprudence because judges fail to appreciate the complexity of 
the concept of capacity. 
One example of this is apparent from a 2006 housing court 
case in which MFY represented a resident of an adult home. In this 
case, the administration of an adult home barred a resident from 
returning to the home after a psychiatric hospital stay because she 
allegedly signed an agreement to voluntarily relinquish her 
residency rights while she was in the hospital.
52
 During a pre-trial 
conference, an MFY attorney indicated that the resident would 
                                                        
50 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
51 See supra notes 6–14 and accompanying text. 
52 See Hemans v. Lakeside Manor Home for Adults, No. 010693/06 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. July 18, 2006) (unpublished decision) (copy on file at MFY). 
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testify that she had been fraudulently induced into signing the 
agreement.
53
 Although the MFY attorney did not raise the issue of 
capacity, the judge responded by stating that if the resident did not 
have the capacity to sign the paper, she would not have the 
capacity to testify about it. The judge essentially recast the 
attorney‘s argument about the adult home operator‘s alleged 
misconduct into one implicating the resident‘s capacity. It is 
extremely unlikely that the judge would have raised the issue of 
capacity if the resident had been hospitalized for a physical 
ailment. The judge‘s statement is an example of inappropriate 
assumptions that litigants who are known to have mental health 
problems face regarding their capacity.  
Given how courts often view the capacity of PWMI, it is not 
surprising that PWMI are often excluded from the witness stand or 
even the courtroom itself. In the Department of Health (DOH) 
proceeding discussed in the introduction, residents were not called 
as witnesses during the hearing and were barred from even 
attending it.
54
 This was true even though investigations of 
numerous complaints made by residents of the adult home served 
as the basis for the proceeding and the residents themselves had a 
great deal at stake in its outcome.
55
 In making this determination, 
the ALJ cited the privacy of those residents whose complaints were 
being discussed as a justification for their exclusion.
56
 It is 
troubling that, given the strong policy that favors open hearings, 
                                                        
53 The information in this sentence and in the rest of the paragraph is based 
on the attorney‘s recollection of the pre-trial conference. In this case, the 
resident was allowed to testify. Unfortunately, however, because she admitted to 
having signed the paper, the judge disregarded testimony by both the resident 
and various clinicians that she had believed she was signing a receipt for her 
allowance. Although the resident‘s argument was that the operator had 
misrepresented the nature of the document to her, the court again seemed to 
recast the argument as one about the resident‘s competency, simply ignoring the 
numerous points on which the testimony of the resident‘s witnesses about the 
circumstances under which the document was signed conflicted with the 
accounts given by the operator‘s witnesses. 
54 See Transcript of Hearing, In the Matter of Antonia C. Novello, supra 
note 1, at 5, 8. 
55 See id., at 8–21, 27. 
56 See id. at ALJ I. 
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the administrative officials did not make more of an effort to 
structure the hearing in such a way that residents‘ privacy could be 
protected without excluding the people who had a strong interest in 
its outcome. MFY had suggested, for example, that pseudonyms be 
used for evidence that included individual residents‘ names. This 
suggestion was rejected without explanation. Interestingly, 
however, the ALJ adopted such an approach in his Report and 
Decision, where he used initials or numbers to refer to the 
residents.
57
   
2. The Inaccurate Assumption that 
 Mental Illness Makes Testimony 
 Inherently Unreliable 
Even when PWMI are allowed to testify at a hearing, their 
testimony is often severely discounted by factfinders.
58
 Factfinders 
often allow prejudices about mental illnesses to interfere with an 
accurate weighing of the credibility of witnesses who have a 
history of mental illness.
59
 Court personnel frequently assume 
PWMI cannot tell the truth, or worse, purposely do not tell the 
truth. Unfortunately, little is done to challenge the widely-held 
belief that a witness with a mental illness is unlikely to be able to 
tell the truth on the stand. 
Susan Stefan, a prominent disability law attorney at the Center 
for Public Representation, has written persuasively that PWMI 
generally are put into one of two categories: those who are 
―discredited‖ and those who are ―discreditable.‖60 Although there 
                                                        
57 See id. at 5. 
58 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. Determination of 
credibility is a jury function, although where a jury is making this determination 
the judge still plays a role when giving the jury instructions. In administrative 
and many housing proceedings and other civil court cases, however, the judge 
determines credibility because there is no jury. Id. 
59 Bernstein, supra note 40, at 53 (pointing out that because factfinders 
often ―mechanically impose[] a stock character type upon the witness,‖ an 
administrative law judge, for example, ―might, unbeknownst to herself, be 
making her determinations based upon a gallery of mental images of 
presumptively credible witnesses‖).  
60 Stefan, supra note 4, at 1349 (quoting ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: 
CREMIN_6-5-09 6/6/2009  12:41 PM 
472 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
are key differences between the two groups, ―[n]either group is 
believed or credited when they report their own perceptions of 
their situations.‖61 Thus, for PWMI, ―credibility is . . . a primary 
issue.‖62 
The defense attorney quoted at the beginning of this Article 
tried to discredit a resident of an adult home by equating having a 
mental illness with being a ―liar.‖63 In that proceeding, the adult 
home operator had a history of serious complaints against him and 
a previous finding that his extensive violations merited non-
renewal of his operating certificate.
64
 However, despite these 
circumstances and evidence that the staff of the home had falsified 
records that it provided to DOH inspectors, the ALJ allowed the 
                                                        
NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 4 (1963)). 
61 Id. at 1378. 
62 Id. at 1379. 
63 See Transcript of Hearing, In the Matter of Antonia C. Novello, supra 
note 1, at 522–24. 
64 See Richard Perez-Pena, 5 From Adult Home Die, Trapped in Burning 
Van, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006, at A1 (―Brooklyn Manor has long been known 
as one of the worst homes, according to records and state officials. Over the 
years, its operators have been cited for a number of violations and abuses that 
included lack of heat, swarming flies, staff shortages, failures to provide medical 
aid and employee assaults on patients. Last year, a fire killed a resident in his 
bed.‖); Marc Santora, Stuck in a Bad Place; With Few Options, State Lets 
Troubled Adult Home Stay Open, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, § 1, at 37 (―As 
early as 1991, state investigators found problems at Brooklyn Manor, 
uncovering evidence that the operator of the home, Benito Fernandez, . . . took 
more than $45,000 in retirement benefits from a resident who had entrusted the 
money to the home [and that] [o]ver the ensuing years, more reports by state 
investigators found that not only was money being misappropriated, but that the 
level of supervision and coordination of care was abysmal.‖); see also New 
York State Coalition for Adult Home Reform, Brooklyn Manor: A Timeline of 
Tragedy, http://www.scaany.org/collaborations/documents/brooklyn_manor_ 
timeline.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2008). The decision, issued on March 7, 1996, 
affirmed the regulators‘ decision not to renew Fernandez‘s operating certificate 
on the ground that he lacked the requisite moral character to run an adult home. 
Although the case—which was commenced by the Department of Social 
Services—lasted two and a half years, and although the decision was based on 
forty-two days of testimony and numerous exhibits, the State inexplicably 
withdrew its case against Fernandez after the decision was issued. The State of 
New York later re-issued Fernandez‘ operating certificate. 
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operator to retain his license.
65
 Various factors contributed to this 
ruling, but the ALJ emphasized in his decision that the DOH 
inspector whose testimony was crucial to the DOH‘s case had 
―failed to check residents‘ records to see if [they] revealed histories 
of making false accusations.‖66 The ALJ therefore appeared to 
follow the lead of the defense attorney in assuming that PWMI are 
liars and placed the burden on them or their advocates to prove 
otherwise, even in the face of significant evidence that the staff of 
the home were the ones guilty of making false statements. 
II. CLINICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE CAPACITY AND 
CREDIBILITY OF PWMI 
References to reliable modern clinical information about 
mental illness are lacking in much of the jurisprudence about 
competency and credibility of PWMI. The assumption in many 
cases seems to be that any history of mental illness is enough to 
impugn an individual‘s ability to perceive or recount events in a 
credible manner. Clinical evidence in the mental health literature, 
however, indicates otherwise.  
There does not appear to be a large body of mental health 
literature specifically addressing the capacity of PWMI to testify in 
civil proceedings.
67
 However, information available in the medical 
psychiatric literature supports the claim that having a particular 
mental health condition does not necessarily mean that an 
individual is incompetent or, in modern clinical terminology, 
―lacks capacity.‖68 There is also substantial clinical evidence to 
support the notion that it is not possible to make generalizations 
                                                        
65 See Transcript of Hearing, In the Matter of Antonia C. Novello, supra 
note 1, at 51.  
66 See id. at 27.  
67 The authors have not found any mental health literature specifically 
addressing this issue.  
68 See Thomas S. Zaubler, Milton Viederman & Joseph J. Fins, Ethical, 
Legal and Psychiatric Issues in Capacity, Competency and Informed Consent: 
An Annotated Bibliography, 18 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 155, 162–63 (1996); 
Laura Weiss Roberts, Evidence-based Ethics and Informed Consent in Mental 
Illness Research, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 540, 540–41 (2000). 
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regarding an individual‘s ability to provide accurate information 
simply based on whether that individual has a psychiatric diagnosis 
or a mental health history.
69
 Mental health research data supports 
the assertion that such determinations require case-by-case 
analyses.  
A. Research on Determining Capacity 
In assessing the capacity of an individual, an experienced 
clinician
70
 will utilize different forms of mental examination and 
interviewing techniques to determine if certain criteria are met. 
Basic criteria for determining capacity routinely include, among 
other things, the individual‘s ability to: (1) express a choice, 
(2) understand relevant information, (3) demonstrate an 
understanding of the circumstances and consequences relevant to 
the current situation, and (4) rationally manipulate information to 
some degree, mainly as it relates to the situation at hand.
71
 As with 
                                                        
69 See Zaubler et al., supra note 68, at 162–63; see generally Roberts, supra 
note 68, at 540 (discussing nuances in determining capacity in individuals with 
―serious psychotic symptoms‖ for the purpose of ethically obtaining their 
informed consent to participate in mental health research protocols). 
70 The term ―clinician‖ refers to ―an individual qualified in the clinical 
practice of medicine, psychiatry, or psychology as distinguished from one 
specializing in laboratory or research techniques or in theory.‖ Medline Plus, 
http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm?book=Medical&va= 
clinician (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). It is important to note that knowing how to 
gather and appropriately use relevant medical, psychiatric, and other personal 
history, in a way which may aid the assessment of capacity without 
unnecessarily violating a person‘s confidentiality or unjustly impugning 
credibility, is a skill that requires proper training, experience and often the 
professional ethics of a licensed mental health practitioner who may be in the 
best position to offer such an opinion.  
71 See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study. I: Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 
19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 105, 109–11 (1995) [hereinafter Appelbaum & Grisso, 
MacArthur Study I]; Roberts, supra note 68, at 540; see generally Janet I. 
Warren et al., Opinion Formation in Evaluating the Adjudicative Competence 
and Restorability of Criminal Defendants: A Review of 8,000 Evaluations, 24 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113 (2006) (analyzing criminal forensic evaluations conducted 
by clinicians in Virginia during a twelve year period). 
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any type of medical or health condition, which may fluctuate or be 
completely ameliorated with proper care and treatment, 
assessments of capacity need to be updated regularly to reflect 
current mental status.
72
 
When applying these criteria in evaluating PWMI, it is 
important to understand that the presence of certain psychiatric 
signs and symptoms alone does not necessarily require a 
determination of incapacity.
73
 Certain mental illnesses, such as 
non-psychotic mood and anxiety disorders, may have little or no 
impact on an individual‘s ability to perceive reality or accurately 
recall past events.
74
 Other mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia 
or mood and anxiety disorders accompanied by psychotic 
symptoms, may affect perception in certain instances, but not in 
ways that necessarily implicate or impede the ability to testify 
accurately.
75
  
                                                        
72 See Appelbaum & Grisso, MacArthur Study I, supra note 71, at 121–22; 
Zaubler et al., supra note 68, at 162–63; Warren et al., supra note 71, at 120–21; 
Roberts, supra note 68, at 540. 
73 See Appelbaum & Grisso, MacArthur Study I, supra note 71, at 107; 
Zaubler et al., supra note 68; Warren et al., supra note 71; Roberts, supra note 
68. The MacCAT-T is an established clinical instrument that is frequently 
employed to determine the competence of psychiatric patients to make informed 
treatment decisions on a case-by-case basis. See generally Thomas. Grisso, Paul 
S. Appelbaum & Carolyn Hill-Fotouhi, The MacCAT-T: A Clinical Tool to 
Assess Patients’ Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 48 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 1415 (1997) [hereinafter Grisso et al., The MacCAT-T]. 
74 See Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Comparison of Standards for 
Assessing Patients’ Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 152 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1033 (1995) [hereinafter Grisso & Appelbaum, Capacities to Make 
Treatment Decisions]; Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study. II: Measures of Abilities Related to Competence to Consent 
to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (1995) [hereinafter Grisso et al., 
MacArthur Study II]. 
75 See Grisso & Appelbaum, Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 
supra note 74; Grisso et al., MacArthur Study II, supra note 74; Grisso et al., 
The MacCAT-T, supra note 73; Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The 
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 171–
73 (1995) [hereinafter Grisso & Appelbaum, MacArthur Study III]; Scott Y.H. 
Kim et al., Determining When Impairment Constitutes Incapacity for Informed 
Consent in Schizophrenia Research, 191 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 38, 40–41 (2007). 
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Psychotic symptoms, including hallucinations, are rarely 
constant and are often specific in nature. An auditory hallucination, 
for example, may frequently involve a person hearing a particular, 
repeated voice or sound.
76
 Therefore, hallucinations may be 
discrete and distinguishable from other occurrences in a person‘s 
daily life.
77
 Psychotic delusions, or beliefs not based in reality, are 
also frequently discrete, specific to one area of a person‘s life, and 
do not necessarily affect a person‘s functional status generally.78  
Training in interviewing PWMI and access to relevant 
background information regarding the interviewee are necessary 
components in evaluating an individual‘s capacity. A typical 
mental status interview includes determining whether an individual 
is oriented to his or her surroundings, including person, place, and 
time.
79
 In addition, experienced clinicians frequently employ 
various interviewing tools in evaluating an individual‘s cognitive 
ability.
80
 As evidenced by some of the landmark psychiatric studies 
of capacity for informed consent cited above,
81
 such tests are 
routinely performed because a person‘s level of capacity or 
incapacity to perceive reality and recall past events can never be 
assumed based solely on the presence of a mental health diagnosis. 
Where there is concern about a witness‘s ability to testify 
accurately, relevant and properly obtained clinical information can 
be extremely helpful in evaluating the testimony.  
                                                        
76 See Michael Garrett & Raul Silva, Auditory Hallucinations, Source 
Monitoring, and the Belief That “Voices” Are Real, 29 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 
445, 449 (2003). 
77 See id. at 452–53. 
78 See Grisso & Appelbaum, Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 
supra note 74; Grisso et al., MacArthur Study II, supra note 74; Grisso et al., 
The MacCAT-T, supra note 73. 
79 See HAROLD I. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, SYNOPSIS OF 
PSYCHIATRY 200–04 (1991) (providing details of a mental status examination); 
see also John Donnelly, Mervin Rosenberg & William P. Fleeson, The Evolution 
of the Mental Status—Past and Future, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 997, 998 (1970) 
(describing the development of ―an organized, systematic methodology‖ for 
mental status examinations). 
80 See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 79. 
81 See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. 
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B. Research on Determining Credibility 
There is little literature that directly addresses the issue of 
determining the credibility of PWMI in civil court proceedings. 
What is available, however, suggests that PWMI are no more 
likely to exhibit criminal or exploitive behaviors such as chronic, 
intentional lying than individuals who do not have major mental 
illness.
82
 Although people who have chronic mental illness are 
more often arrested for ―nuisance‖ type crimes as a consequence of 
exhibiting psychiatric symptoms in public, these activities are 
clearly not what is generally considered to be criminal behavior.
83
  
Research shows that lying is somewhat commonplace in the 
general population. For example, one study concluded that 
―American college students on average tell two lies a day, and 
ordinary people in the community one a day.‖84 Research also 
indicates that ―some people lie more than others,‖ and ―that those 
who tell more lies are more manipulative, more concerned with 
self-presentation, and more sociable, but less socialized.‖85 In 
general, it is not easy to detect when someone is lying; ―a number 
of studies have demonstrated that people are poor lie detectors, 
being able to identify lies in experimental studies at about chance 
                                                        
82 See Paul S. Appelbaum, Pamela Clark Robbins & John Monahan, 
Violence and Delusions: Data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment 
Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566, 571 (2000); Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. 
Harris, A Comparison of Criminal Recidivism Among Schizophrenic and 
Nonschizophrenic Offenders, 15 INT. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 397, 404–05 (1992); 
Jennifer L. Skeem & Edward P. Mulvey, Psychopathy and Community Violence 
Among Civil Psychiatric Patients: Results from the MacArthur Violence Risk 
Assessment Study, 69 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 358, 369–70 
(2001). 
83 See H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons with Severe 
Mental Illness in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 
483(1998), available at http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content 
/full/49/4/483#R494105; Gold Award Article, Helping Mentally Ill People 
Break the Cycle of Jail and Homelessness: The Thresholds, State, County, 
Collaborative Jail Linkage Project, Chicago, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1380, 
1380–81 (2001). 
84 Don Grubin, Commentary: Getting at the Truth about Pathological 
Lying, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 350, 350 (2005). 
85 Id. at 351. 
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rates, and sometimes below chance.‖86  
What is predictive in terms of determining which individuals 
are more likely to be chronic liars or exhibit other acts of 
criminality is a cluster of behaviors and behavioral patterns 
characterized as ―psychopathy.‖ The term psychopathy, described 
by psychiatrist Hervey Cleckley in 1964, refers to certain 
behaviors or patterns of behavior that involve the chronic 
exploitation or violation of the rights of others.
87
 Individuals who 
exhibit repeated patterns of these behaviors are frequently 
described by mental health professionals as having ―antisocial 
personality traits‖ or ―antisocial personality disorder.‖88 As many 
in the legal and criminal justice professions know, people with 
antisocial personality disorder may be as inconspicuous, in terms 
of their superficial behavior and appearance, as anyone else in the 
general population.  
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Volume IV TR (DSMIVTR) is used by mental health professionals 
to classify and characterize varying forms of mental illnesses 
according to different historical, observable, and symptomatic 
                                                        
86 Id. Technological improvements may lead to better tools for lie 
detection—and difficult constitutional questions for courts—in the future. See 
Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie 
Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 359, 360–61 (2007) 
(noting that ―[s]everal new technologies use measurements of blood flow or 
electrical impulses in the brain to identify distinct indicators of deceptive 
communication,‖ but that ―[e]ven the most accurate lie detection techniques are, 
at this point, unproven‖). See also Joseph H. Baskin, Judith G. Edersheim & 
Bruce H. Price, Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Neuroimaging in the 
Courtroom, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 239, 265 (2007) (noting that ―[s]everal new 
studies have posited that MRIs can be successfully used to identify brain 
changes in individuals who fabricate information‖ and that ―[t]his information 
could benefit both civil and criminal litigation‖); Yaling Yang et al., Prefrontal 
White Matter in Pathological Liars, 187 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 320, 321–22 
(2005) (finding that the prefrontal cortex of ―liars‖ showed an average increase 
of twenty-two percent in the amount of ―white matter‖ and a decrease in the 
amount of grey matter). 
87 HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY 362–63 (4th ed. 1964). 
88 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, FOURTH EDITION TEXT REVISION 701–06 
(2000). 
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criteria.
89
 Antisocial personality disorder is defined by, among 
other characteristics, a historical and repetitive pattern of 
intentional deception and exploitation of others.
90
 In contrast, there 
is no reference to exploitative or intentionally deceptive behavior 
in the list of criteria for chronic mental disorders such as 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and other mood and anxiety 
disorders.
91
 In terms of diagnostic DSMIVTR criteria, there is 
therefore no direct, necessary connection between psychopathic 
behavior and having these major mental disorders, just as there is 
no such direct, necessary connection in people who do not have a 
major mental illness. 
In terms of assessing tendencies for psychopathic behavior, the 
Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL–R) is one of the most well-
established (in terms of statistical validity and reliability) and 
frequently used tools to evaluate and predict an individual‘s 
potential for exhibiting such behaviors.
92
 PCL–R scores have also 
been shown to be a valid means of evaluating degrees of 
psychopathy.
93
 In general, higher PCL–R scores are predictive of 
greater tendencies toward criminal behaviors.
94
 This evaluative 
tool has been useful in predicting such behavior among various 
populations, including both incarcerated and unincarcerated 
groups.
95
 As would be expected, in general higher PCL–R scores 
                                                        
89 See generally id.  
90 See id. at 701–06. 
91 See id. at 297–331, 345–400, 429–76. 
92 See ROBERT D. HARE, THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST–REVISED: 
PCL-R (2d ed. 2003). 
93 See JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE 
MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 37–60 (2001); 
Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy: A Clinical Construct Whose Time Has Come, 23 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 25, 25–28, 30–32, 36–41 (1996); Martin Hildebrand, 
Corine De Ruiter & Henk Nijman, PCL-R Psychopathy Predicts Disruptive 
Behavior Among Male Offenders in a Dutch Forensic Psychiatric Hospital, 19 
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 13, 23–24 (2004). 
94 See MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 93; Marnie E. Rice, Violent Offender 
Research and Implications for the Criminal Justice System, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 
414, 414–18 (1997). 
95 See MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 93; Marnie E. Rice, Grant T. Harris & 
Catherine A. Cormier, An Evaluation of a Maximum Security Therapeutic 
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have been found in individuals who are either incarcerated or who 
have significant criminal histories.  
Research also indicates that individuals with psychiatric 
illnesses who have significant criminal histories exhibit higher 
levels of psychopathy.
96
 Similarly, non-mentally ill people who 
have come into significant contact with the criminal justice system 
(and even such individuals who have not had legal problems per se 
but who admit to violence and other antisocial acts) also score 
higher on established psychopathy measures, supporting the 
assertion that these measures are reliable predictors of violence and 
criminality.
97
 
The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study,
98
 which was 
a landmark investigation of potential dangerousness among people 
with psychotic delusions, further dispelled widely-held beliefs 
about PWMI being a more violent, criminally-predisposed group. 
This study and others have concluded that even those PWMI who 
tend to be most obviously ill with frank delusions are not 
necessarily more likely to commit violent acts than the general 
population.
99
  
                                                        
Community for Psychopaths and Other Mentally Disordered Offenders, 16 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 399, 399–400, 408 (1992); Michael R. Levenson, Kent A. Kiehl 
& Cory M. Fitzpatrick, Assessing Psychopathic Attributes in a Non-
institutionalized Population, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151 (1995). 
96 See C.D. Hill, R. Rogers & M.E. Bickford, Predicting Aggressive and 
Socially Disruptive Behavior in a Maximum Security Forensic Psychiatric 
Hospital, 41 J. FORENSIC SCI. 56, 56–59 (1996); Grant T. Harris, Marnie E. Rice 
& Vernon L. Quinsey, Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders: 
The Development of a Statistical Prediction Instrument, 20 CRIM., JUST. & 
BEHAV. 315, 315–33 (1993); Hildebrand et al., supra note 93, at 16–26. 
97 See Ralph C. Serin, Violent Recidivism in Criminal Psychopaths, 20 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 207 (1996); Ralph C. Serin, Psychopathy and Violence in 
Criminals, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 423, 423–30 (1991); Rice, supra note 
94, at 421–23; David DeMatteo, Kirk Heilbrun & Geoffrey Marczyk, An 
Empirical Investigation of Psychopathy in a Noninstitutionalized and 
Noncriminal Sample, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 133, 133–46 (2006). 
98 See MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 93. 
99 See id.; Appelbaum, Robbins & Monahan, supra note 82; Thomas 
Stompe, Gerhard Ortwein-Swoboda & Hans Schanda, Schizophrenia, 
Delusional Symptoms and Violence: The Threat/Control-Override Concept 
Reexamined, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 31, 40–41 (2004); Paul S. Appelbaum, 
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Accordingly, individuals having a primary psychiatric 
diagnosis alone (i.e., a mood, anxiety or psychotic disorder) are not 
more likely to exhibit psychopathic or antisocial behavior than 
those who have not been so diagnosed. Some studies have even 
indicated that non-psychopathic people with mental illness have a 
lower likelihood of physical aggression, beyond self-directed 
aggressive acts of suicide attempts and self-mutilation.
100
 
Admittedly, there is limited data that exclusively addresses the 
issue of lying under oath in court proceedings. The extensive body 
of literature available on the subject of psychopathic behavior, 
however, indicates that people with chronic mental illness who do 
not have criminal histories (apart from arrests for ―nuisance‖ type 
crimes) do not have any higher levels of psychopathy or tendencies 
toward deceitfulness than their non-criminal, non-mentally ill 
counterparts in the general population.
101
  
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this part, we set forth recommendations that would improve 
the ability of courts to provide PWMI with fair hearings. These 
recommendations include: (1) providing training for court 
personnel, advocates, and guardians ad litem (GALs) to improve 
their understanding of mental illness and PWMI; (2) enforcing 
legal and evidentiary standards in light of modern clinical research 
findings; and (3) providing reasonable accommodations that would 
assist PWMI to access the court system in order to prosecute or 
defend their rights adequately.  
A. Recommendation 1: Mental Health Training Should be 
Provided to Court Personnel, Advocates, and GALs  
When considering the problems PWMI encounter in civil and 
administrative proceedings and contemplating what solutions may 
                                                        
One Madman Keeping Loaded Guns: Misconceptions of Mental Illness and 
Their Legal Consequences, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1105, 1106 (2004). 
100 Hill, et al., supra note 96, at 58. 
101 See Appelbaum, Robbins & Monahan, supra note 82; Rice & Harris, 
supra note 82; Skeem & Mulvey, supra note 82. 
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exist, it is instructive to examine recent developments in the 
criminal justice setting. In response to widespread discontent with 
the way criminal defendants with mental illnesses were treated in 
traditional criminal courts, many states, including New York, have 
established what are known as mental health courts.
102
  
A mental health court typically has a staff dedicated to the 
court part, including not only a judge and other court personnel but 
also a mental health case worker.
103
 Personnel are given specific 
training in communicating effectively with PWMI.
104
 The court 
then works with prosecutors and defense attorneys to develop a 
plan that offers defendants opportunities to receive treatment 
instead of punishment and to connect them with treatment facilities 
and other services in the community.
105
 Although long-term data 
on the effectiveness of these efforts are limited, they appear to 
represent a much needed initiative to address the needs of PWMI 
in the criminal justice system.
106
 There is no reason to think that 
                                                        
102 See DEREK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, RETHINKING THE REVOLVING 
DOOR: A LOOK AT MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE COURTS 7–8 (2001), available at 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/mental_health.pdf.  
103 See id. at 9. 
104 See Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, The Role of Mental Health 
Courts in System Reform, http://www.bazelon.org/issues/criminalization/ 
publications/mentalhealthcourts/index.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2009). 
105 See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 102, at 10. 
106 This is not to say that mental health courts are not without their 
problems. As Wolff has pointed out, ―[m]ental health courts create stigma by 
segregating people by illness and then defining their uniqueness and 
irresponsibility in terms of the illness. Furthermore, labeling the court a ‗mental 
health‘ court, focuses public attention on psychiatric issues, and amplifies the 
mark associated with the court.‖ Nancy Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents: 
Thinking Past the Novelty of Mental Health Courts, 30 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY L. 431, 434 (2002). Wolff also points out that ―[m]ental health 
courts assume uncritically that criminal behavior is caused by a psychiatric 
problem‖ and ignore ―socioeconomic and historical factors that predispose 
[individuals] to committing crimes.‖ Id. at 432. A study published by the 
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law also pointed out flaws or limitations of 
the mental health court model. One conclusion was that ―[m]any of the existing 
courts include practices that are unnecessarily burdensome to defendants, that 
make it harder for them to reintegrate into the community and that may 
compromise their rights.‖ Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, The Role of 
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similar efforts would not be beneficial to the PWMI and the 
personnel who deal with them in the civil court system as well. 
Training that challenges biases against PWMI and equips court 
personnel to communicate more effectively with them should also 
be expanded beyond specialized court parts. PWMI generally do 
not appear different from other people and many litigants with 
mental illness do not wish to disclose their diagnoses. Even when a 
mental illness is obviously present or must be revealed during 
litigation, the continued social stigma associated with mental 
illness may cause some litigants to opt out of a specialized court 
part. For this reason and others, all court personnel, as well as 
advocates, should be given training to understand mental illness.  
As a consequence of stigma and potentially debilitating 
symptoms, PWMI are often at a great disadvantage when 
attempting to advocate for themselves in a court system that is 
generally ill-equipped to accommodate them. A primary goal in 
training court personnel and advocates should be to sensitize them 
to any misperceptions or biases they might have toward PWMI. 
Such training should not supplant the use, where appropriate, of 
clinical expertise during litigation. It should, however, provide a 
basic background in the complexity of mental illness, the dangers 
of lumping into one category all those who have mental illnesses, 
and the need to avoid drawing unwarranted conclusions about the 
relevance of a mental disability to a legal proceeding.  
In addition to some clinical background, all advocates and 
personnel who might come in professional contact with PWMI 
should be trained on ways in which they might communicate more 
effectively with litigants and witnesses with mental illnesses. The 
goal is not to transform all court personnel into pseudo-
therapists—in fact, care should be taken to discourage judges from 
assuming the role that has been referred to in the criminal justice 
context as ―psychologists in black robes.‖107 However, a shift in 
                                                        
Mental Health Courts in System Reform, http://www.bazelon.org/issues/ 
criminalization/publications/mentalhealthcourts/index.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 
2009). This study also pointed out that a mental health court cannot be ―effective 
unless the services and supports that individuals with serious mental illnesses 
need to live in the community are available.‖ Id.  
107 DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 102, at 19. 
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attitude and some simple interviewing techniques can be extremely 
helpful in eliciting information from those whose mental illnesses 
interfere with their ability to communicate clearly at times. For 
example, setting ground rules during interviews, redirecting clients 
who tend to be over-inclusive or tangential, and explaining why 
certain questions are being asked, may all help in gathering the 
information they need to provide quality representation.  
Interviewing litigants with certain mental illnesses may require 
added patience. However, advocates who are willing to assist 
clients with mental illnesses through the sometimes more time-
consuming process of fact-finding interviews may be rewarded 
with vital information that cannot be obtained through any other 
means. Several years ago, an attorney from MFY received reports 
that several female residents of an adult home had been repeatedly 
sexually assaulted by an administrator of the home. The attorney 
spent a great deal of time interviewing each of the residents 
because all were in a state of decompensation at the time, and their 
delusions about other areas of their lives often led them off the 
track of the questions being asked.
108
 However, by persisting 
through these at times challenging interviews, the attorney 
involved noted that every victim reported a few very specific 
details pertaining to the occurrence of the alleged crimes. Culling 
these consistent details from their tangential accounts bolstered the 
credibility of her report to the enforcement agency responsible for 
overseeing adult homes.
109
  
MFY attorneys are frequently required to gather information 
from clients with various communication difficulties. It requires 
patience, empathy, and, as a threshold matter, an avoidance of the 
                                                        
108 The victims in this case were all delusional. One result of systemic 
failure to listen to people with delusions is a tendency on the part of 
unscrupulous individuals to target such people as victims, assuming that such 
victims will not report the abuse, or that if they report the abuse, they will not be 
believed.  
109 Unfortunately, the Department of Social Services (DSS), then in charge 
of overseeing adult homes, handled this complaint merely by interviewing the 
accused, who, not surprisingly, denied the allegations. DSS took no action 
against the home, and the administrator, although he did not continue in the 
position, went on to work at a health care facility.  
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assumption that because a client is mentally ill, he or she will not 
be able to tell the truth. Although most attorneys at MFY have no 
formal training in mental health, periodic in-house trainings by 
mental health professionals, as well as experience communicating 
with clients with mental illnesses, have helped them conduct 
productive interviews with clients who have severe thought and 
speech pattern disturbances. This experience has shown that basic 
training can lead to greater understanding.  
Training is particularly important for GALs. Some litigants 
with mental illnesses, while capable of managing their own day-to-
day affairs, lack the capacity to participate in certain aspects of 
their own cases and may benefit from the appointment of a 
GAL.
110
 GALs are appointed by the court at the request of litigants 
or by the court sua sponte where it appears that the party in 
question is ―incapable of adequately prosecuting or defending‖ his 
or her rights.
111
 A GAL may discharge various functions that his or 
her ward, but for a mental disability, would do to prosecute or 
defend a case. In some cases, this may include applying for public 
benefits in a non-payment eviction proceeding or seeking 
assistance from the state‘s Adult Protective Services program to 
address a clutter problem in a nuisance eviction proceeding.
112
 It 
may also include a factual investigation of the ward‘s possible 
claims or defenses.
113
  
A properly trained GAL may be of tremendous assistance in 
ensuring that an individual with mental illness receives a fair 
hearing. However, the appointment of a GAL who is not properly 
trained may simply have the affect of replicating unjust aspects of 
                                                        
110 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1201 (McKinney 2008); see generally Jeanette 
Zelhof, Andrew Goldberg & Hina Shamsi, Protecting the Rights of Litigants 
with Diminished Capacity in the New York City Housing Courts, 3 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 733 (2006). 
111 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1201 (McKinney 2008). Again, it should be stressed that 
the need for a GAL specifically addresses the inability to participate effectively 
in a court case. It should not be assumed that every litigant with a mental illness 
requires a GAL, nor should it be assumed that someone who requires a GAL 
lacks competence to give testimony or lacks credibility. 
112 See Zelhof, Goldberg & Shamsi, supra note 110, at 763. 
113 See id.  
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the court system and potentially harming the litigant.  
B. Recommendation 2: Legal and Evidentiary Standards 
Should be Enforced in Light of Modern Clinical 
Research Findings 
Certain legal standards, particularly related to the relevance of 
mental health history and the credibility of testimony by PWMI, 
should be enforced in light of current knowledge about mental 
illness. The idea that it is always necessary for a jury to hear about 
a witness‘s mental health diagnosis to evaluate her testimony is 
contradicted by clinical information that indicates that most mental 
illnesses do not affect a person‘s ability to perceive events or her 
ability to recount them. The generalizations that courts make 
concerning the admissibility of a witness‘s mental health history 
should be re-examined, particularly when the person giving 
testimony is the litigant and his or her rights may be unfairly 
prejudiced by the admission or misuse of mental health 
information.  
Professor Tess Wilkinson-Ryan has argued that ―most 
jurisdictions are overly permissive in admitting evidence of the 
accuser‘s psychiatric make-up and history‖ in civil and criminal 
cases involving sexual misconduct.
114
 In making this argument, she 
notes that, because ―courts implicitly rely on outdated and 
inaccurate conceptions of psychiatric practice, it is too easy for 
defendants to introduce evidence that has no logical bearing on the 
complainant‘s credibility but will nonetheless prejudice the jury 
against her.‖115  
This argument is generally applicable to the use of such 
evidence to impeach the credibility of PWMI. Due to the limited 
probative value and the considerable prejudicial effect of mental 
health evidence, ―most psychological evidence should be 
inadmissible because its relevance is substantially outweighed by 
its prejudicial effects.‖116 There are at least two reasons for this 
                                                        
114 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 33, at 1375. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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conclusion. First, psychology is ―often misunderstood by courts 
and juries alike.‖117 The admission of evidence of a litigant‘s or 
witness‘s mental health history can therefore ―create prejudice and 
confusion for the court and jury.‖118 Second, the admission of such 
evidence can also ―humiliate the [litigant or witness].‖119 The 
likelihood of such evidence being admitted into evidence may 
therefore deter PWMI who are potential litigants from seeking 
justice. 
Evidence of a witness‘s mental health history is probative only 
if it holds ―a specific and scientifically legitimate relevance to the 
[witness‘s] credibility.‖120 Even then, the probative value of such 
evidence ―should be balanced against the potentially misleading 
and confusing effect that the information will have on the fact-
finding process.‖121 As Wilkinson-Ryan has pointed out, careful 
adherence to the rules of evidence would reduce the amount of 
psychiatric evidence that is admitted as evidence.
122
 Advocates for 
PWMI should therefore consider filing motions in limine on these 
bases to exclude the use of mental health evidence to impeach the 
credibility of their clients or witnesses.  
C. Recommendation 3: Civil Courts Should Provide 
Reasonable Accommodations to Improve the 
Accessibility for PWMI. 
Often, the reason that the testimony of PWMI is not heard is 
because courts fail to provide the accommodations necessary for 
their testimony to be taken. Giving testimony in a deposition or at 
trial can be a highly stressful experience for anyone.
123
 For people 
                                                        
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 1376. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 See id.  
123 Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in 
Litigation, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 105, 108 (2000) (―Being a party in litigation is an 
extremely stressful event. It ranks near the death of a loved one, the loss of a 
job, and the experience of a grave illness.‖). 
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who have severe anxiety, major depression, agoraphobia (fear of 
leaving one‘s home), or certain other mental illnesses, the very 
prospect of testifying may be overwhelming.
124
 For others who 
have difficulties in processing thoughts in a linear fashion or who 
may have limited or atypical verbal expression, the inflexible 
forms in which testimony is supposed to be elicited and conveyed 
may be difficult to master.
125
 There are several accommodations 
that can be made to facilitate the full participation of PWMI in 
their own cases.  
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was intended to 
usher in ―a bright new era of equality, independence, and freedom‖ 
for people with physical and mental disabilities.
126
 Title II of the 
ADA requires public entities, such as courts, to be accessible to 
these individuals.
127
 The Supreme Court has held that ―this duty to 
accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established due 
process principle that, ‗within the limits of practicability, a State 
                                                        
124 Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Appellate Decision-Making in the Context 
of Disabled Litigants, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 313, 325 (2000) (―Litigation 
involving persons with disabilities takes place in many different contexts: civil, 
criminal, matrimonial, and administrative, to name just a few. However, all legal 
contexts share the potential to demoralize, alienate, and entrench symptoms of 
suspicion, bewilderment, and disenfranchisement for those with disabilities.‖). 
125 Winick, supra note 123, at 110 (―Surely one of the most stressful 
emotional aspects of a lawsuit is when the client testifies at trial or has his or her 
deposition taken by the adverse party. The courtroom is a public place, and 
testimony is taken from the witness stand in the presence of a variety of 
strangers and enemies. Public speaking even in a friendly and supportive 
environment can produce great stress for those who are inexperienced in doing 
it. Playing such a key speaking role on center stage in the courtroom can thus be 
a nightmare for many clients. Even depositions, which typically are taken in a 
lawyer‘s office, will nonetheless be taken in front of strangers such as the court 
reporter and also the adversarial parties in the lawsuit and their attorneys.‖). 
126 President George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of the Ams. with 
Disabilities Act (July 26, 1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/ 
35th/videos/ada_signing_text.html. 
127 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004) (―Recognizing that 
failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will often have the same 
practical effect as outright exclusion, Congress required the States to take 
reasonable measures to remove architectural and other barriers to 
accessibility.‖).  
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must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard‘ in its courts.‖ In reaching this decision, the Court 
emphasized the ―fundamental right of access to the courts.‖128  
Almost all of the focus of courthouse compliance with the 
ADA has been with respect to physical access. ―[T]he question of 
what aids and services are helpful for people with mental 
disabilities is largely unexplored and must also be the subject of 
discussion among judges, lawyers, mental health professionals, 
people with disabilities, and court personnel.‖129 
Recognizing that the prospect of submitting to a deposition or a 
standard examination on the witness stand can be so stressful as to 
be outside of the realm of possibility for litigants with certain 
mental illnesses, in many cases MFY attorneys have successfully 
sought various accommodations to prevent this type of problem 
from shutting litigants out of their proceedings. For example, 
judges can allow for interrogatories in lieu of depositions or limit 
the length of depositions.
130
 Judges can also grant leeway in terms 
of evidentiary rules, such as the prohibition against leading 
questions on direct examination, where attorneys indicate that 
strict adherence to form is likely to prevent them from being able 
to elicit information from their clients or witnesses. Attorneys 
should also ask judges to be cognizant of the special needs of their 
clients during cross-examination and to be especially watchful that 
they are not harassed by opposing counsel. 
                                                        
128 Id. at 533–34. 
129 Zelhof, Goldberg & Shamsi, supra note 110, at 770. The exception is 
mental health courts, which, ―[i]n following the legal theory of therapeutic 
jurisprudence . . . are attempting to improve justice by considering the 
therapeutic and antitherapeutic consequences that ‗flow from substantive rules, 
legal procedures, or the behavior of legal actors (lawyers and judges).‘‖ Wolff, 
supra note 106, at 431. 
130 See, e.g., Goldman v. Eggers, No. L&T 64884/2001 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Oct. 
19, 2001) (ordering that ―discovery in this case [shall] proceed with the 
production of documents and then with interrogatories rather than an oral 
deposition‖ based on evidence of respondent‘s medical condition) (unpublished 
decision) (copy on file at MFY).  
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Other accommodations that would help make courts more 
accessible for PWMI include: 
1.   Setting up a quiet waiting room for litigants for whom 
the sometimes chaotic and noisy environment of the 
courthouses may exacerbate the symptoms of mental illness 
and the stressors contributing to decompensation.
131
 
2.  Allowing for the flexible scheduling of hearings for 
litigants who, for example, take medication that has the 
side effect of making it difficult to wake up or be coherent 
in the morning.
132
  
3. Allowing, upon request, priority for litigants or  
witnesses with disabilities for whom a long wait in court 
might exacerbate agitation and confusion.
133
 
4. Allowing, upon request, for telephone or video 
appearances and testimony, or in-home hearings for 
litigants or witnesses with disabilities such as agoraphobia, 
claustrophobia, or age-related infirmities. 
134
  
CONCLUSION 
Despite clinical information and some jurisprudence to the 
contrary, the apparent perception among many court and legal 
personnel is that PWMI are generally incompetent and deceptive 
witnesses. Because of these widespread misperceptions, the 
disparity between myth and truth remains an imposing obstacle 
when it comes to obtaining justice and equal opportunities for 
PWMI in civil court. Courts and advocates should be doing all that 
is in their power to ensure that PWMI do not fall through the 
cracks when it comes to obtaining justice. With reasonable 
accommodations, PWMI can have meaningful opportunities to 
participate in litigation that concerns their lives. 
Whenever possible, PWMI should have the opportunity to 
testify in hearings where decisions will be made affecting their 
                                                        
131 See Zelhof, Goldberg & Shamsi, supra note 110, at 770. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 771. 
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lives. First, these individuals are generally the ones best qualified 
to speak about their own experiences. Second, regardless of 
whether individuals are able to recall their experiences well or 
always communicate effectively, it is essential that judges and 
juries be confronted with the humanity of those about whom they 
will be making decisions and learn to be patient in listening to the 
evidence they present. Third, the opportunity to participate in a 
hearing, if handled properly, can be a highly empowering 
experience for litigants who have grown accustomed to being 
ignored or having to rely on others to speak for them.
135
  
The New York State Court of Appeals has warned of the 
danger of structuring proceedings in such a way that people with 
mental disabilities were not given voice. In the Matter of Joan 
Brown v. Ristich involved an accusation by a developmentally 
disabled resident of the infamous Willowbrook State School that a 
staff member had attacked her with a broom, lacerating her 
head.
136
 The only eyewitnesses in the case were two other 
residents, both of whom were also developmentally disabled. In 
reinstating the administrative decision against Willowbrook, which 
had been based in part on these residents‘ testimony, the court 
noted the growing concerns about treatment of residents in such 
institutions and set forth the important policies bolstering its 
decision: 
The right of petitioner [the Director of Willowbrook] is 
undeniable. However, we cannot overlook the rights of 
institutional residents, especially those incapable of 
eloquent expression and abstract thought. These people also 
deserve a fair hearing. To deny them the right to complain 
of their treatment because they lack the ability to 
conceptualize the nature of an oath would be blinding 
ourselves to reality.
137
  
                                                        
135 Winick, supra note 123, at 106 (―People like the opportunity to 
participate in a process that affects them; they dislike being excluded from 
participating. This participatory or dignitary value of process produces litigant 
satisfaction and a greater degree of acceptance of and compliance with the 
ultimate decision reached.‖).  
136 Brown v. Ristich, 36 N.Y.2d 183, 190 (1975). 
137 Id. at 191–92. 
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These words still ring true for people with all types of mental 
disabilities, whether they are institutionalized or living in the 
community. The very fact that their testimony is too often never 
heard or taken seriously makes PWMI greater targets of abuse and 
exploitation. It is our hope that this article will promote greater 
awareness of these occurrences so that they occur with less 
frequency and PWMI are given an equal playing field to defend 
themselves and to seek redress when they have been wronged. 
